State of Utah v. Michael Joseph Jiminez : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
State of Utah v. Michael Joseph Jiminez : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Randall Gaither; Attorney for Defendant-Appellant;
Robert B. Hansen; Robert R. Wallace; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Jiminez, No. 15776 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1246
IN THE SUPREME COU~T OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -·-
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
MICHAEL JOSEPH JIMINEZ, . 
RANDALL GAITHER 
321 South 6th East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant 
~ase Ne. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE----------- l 
DISPOSITIO'.'l IN THE LOHER COURT---------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL----------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS---------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS THE 
AUTHORITY TO FILE AND 
SUBSCRIBE A CRIMINAL 
INFORMATION IN A STATE 
DISTRICT COURT----------- 10 
POINT II: APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO 
OBJECT TO THE ALLEGED 
DEFECTS IN THE INFORMATION 
WHEN SUCH DEFECTS EASILY 
COULD HAVE BEEN CORRECTED 
BY RESPONDENT, WAIVED HIS 
SUBSEQUENT OBJECTION----- 15 
POINT III: BECAUSE THE STATE PROVED 
ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF 
THE CRIME OF THEFT BY 
DECEPTION, THE LOWER 
COURT PROPERLY DENIED 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS------------------ 26 
CONCLUSION------------------------------------ 31 
CASES CITED 
Arnold v. State, 233 Ark. 3, 342 S.W.2d 569 
(I Io. 1959 )-------------------------- 22 
Beasley v. People, 168 Colo. 286, 450 P.2d 
658 (1969)-------------------------- 31 
Gerlaugh v. Florida Parole Commission, 139 
So.2d 888 (Fla. 1962), ------------- 22 
Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 
177 (1969)-------------------------- 13 
Meyers v. Second Judicial District Court, 
108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 711 (1945)---- 11,12 
-i-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
N.L.R.B. v. Ertel Mfg. Corp., 352 F.2d 916 
Page 
(C.A. Ind., 1965)--------------------- 17 
N.L.R.B. v. Florida Agric. Supply Co., 328 
F.2d 989 (C.A. Fla. 1964)------------- 17 
People v. Karrella, 35 Mich.App. 541, 142 
N.W.2d 676 (1971)--------------------- 13,15 
People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396 (1868)------------- 14 
Sacramento County v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., 
61 Cal. 250 (1882)-------------------- 11,12,16 
State v. Amart, 328 S.W.2d 569 (Mo. 1959)------- 22 
State v. Daviess Circuit Court, 236 Inc. 624, 
142 N.E.2d 626 (1957)----------------- 13,15 
State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lumber Co., 
257 S.W. 453 (Mo. 1924)--------------- 15 
State ex rel. Landis v. S.H. Kress & Co., 
155 So. 823 (Fla. 1934)--------------- 14 
State v. Fisher, 70 Utah 115, 8 P.2d 589 
(1932)-------------------------------- 29 
State v. Morris, 85 Utah 210, 38 P.2d 1097 
(1934)-------------------------------- 29 
State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741 
(1945)-------------------------------- 25 
Stokes v. State, Okl. Cr., 336 P.2d 425 
(1961)----------~--------------------- 31 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (1953) I as amended------ 11,16 
Utah Coe·:· rinn .. § 68-3-1 (1953) I as amended------ 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-401 (1953), as amended---- 2G-28,31 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended---- 1,26 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-2 (1953), as amended----- 21 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3 (1953), as amended----- 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-5(2) (1953) , as amended-- 20,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1953) I as amended----- 19 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-3 (2) (b) (1953), as 
amended------------------------------- 24 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (2) (b) (1953), as 
amended------------------------------- 19,24 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10 (1953), as amended---- 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-34-1 (1953), as amended----- 22 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-10 (1953), as amended---- 22 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library S rvices and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
PAGE 
6 C.J. 816----------------------------------------- 15 
7 C.J.S., Attorney General, § 9, p. 1234----------- 13 
National Association of Attorneys General, 
Corrunittee on the Office of Attorney 
General, February, 1971, page 39--------- 14 
CONSTITUTIONS CITED 
Utah Constitution, Article VII, § 1---------------- 10 
Utah Constitution, Article VII, § 18--------------- 11 
-iii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 15776 
MICHAEL JOSEPH JIMINEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal by Appellant from his criminal conviction 
for Theft by Deception, a second degree felony, in violation 
of ·Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
An?ellant was convicted by a jury in the Third 
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, ane 
sentenced by Judge Dean Conder to a term in prison of not 
less than one nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State 
Prison. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent prays this Court to affirm the decision 
of the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts is divided into two varts. 
Subsection A states the facts of the offense. Subsection B 
outlines the procedural steps before trial. 
A. 
Mr. Anthony Escabar, a former professional soccer 
player and owner of Alpha Distributing Co., a Salt Lake City 
home furnishings distributor, was introduced in June,1976, to 
the appellant, Michael Joseph Jiminez (T. 11), and began 
business dealings with.defendant. 
The appellant represented to Mr. Escabar: (1) that 
he was Chairman of the Board of Directors of Tri-Delta 
Corporation, a large California corporation, (2) that Tri-
Delta owned Frontier U.S.A., a multi-million dollar corporation 
with stock trading at $5.00 per share in the over-the-counter 
. market (T. 18); (3) that he had millions of dollars of Exxon 
20~ Phillips Petroleum Co~pany stock available to hi~ th~ou~.~ 
Kimberly-Beers Company; (4) that he owned Zero Cold, a large 
restaurant equipment supply corporation doing the major 
-2- j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
supplying to such large food chains as Kentucky Fried Chicken, 
Wendy's Restaurants, McDonalds, Winchel's Donuts (Exh. 2, 
T. 19), (5) that he owned Harbor Rest Memorial Park in Southern 
California; (6) that he owned White Barns Condominiums in 
Ogden, Utah, the Capitol Heights Apartment Building project 
behind the State Capitol Building in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and a large shopping center, Continental Bank & Trust, an Idaho 
Bank, and Dollar A Day Rent A Car, (T. 18-21); (7) that he 
could get any amount of money from the Ogden branch of First 
Security Bank of Utah, where he already had a number of loans 
in excess of several million dollars secured by some of his 
stock in his various companies (T. 21). 
That these representations were made, is corroborated 
by a brochure from Tri-Delta Corporation given to Mr. Escabar 
by the appellant (Exh. 2, T. 21) and by testimony of other 
witnesses including Ogden Attorney Robert V. Phillips (T. 155-
160). 
Based upon these representations of financial success 
and the appellant's claimed ability to provide sufficient capital, 
o:i ~1_i_ly 1}, -1976, >Ir .. ~scabar entered into an agree:ri.e:i.t -:.v:...t.h 
the appellant to attempt to acquire a soccer franchise and 
operate a soccer team in Utah (T. 23, 31, 39). 
-3-
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The essential elements of the agreement between 
the appellant and Mr. Escabar were that Mr. Escabar would 
(1) remain President of his own Alpha Distributing Company, 
which would be taken over by appellant's multi-million dollar 
Company, Frontier U.S.A; (2) become Vice President of Frontim 
U.S.A.; (3) receive $20,000.00 cash as a down payment for the 
purchase of Alpha Distributing by Frontier, and which would be 
used for soccer expenses; (4) receive Frontier U.S.A. stock 
worth $200,000.00, at the going rate of $5.00 per share; 
(5) become President of the to-be-acquired soccer team which 
would be known as the Utah Pioneers; (6) receive a car and a 
credit line from Tri-Delta Corporation_ (T.26-37,44). Defendant 
was to: (1) Pay the $20,000.00 cash to Escabar and (2) 
financially support the Utah Pioneers Soccer Team through 
T~i-Delta Corporation and Frontier U.S.A. (T. 29-32, 74). 
Appellant stated that he would give all the profits from the 
operation of the soccer team to the LDS Church. This fact 
was stated-again for the press and public at subsequent news 
conferences through major Salt Lake City television stations 
'--"-J newspa;:iers (T.40,42). The defendant had a letter p __ -~;:ia.ced 
for Mr. Escabar's use which stated, in relevant part, that: 
-4-
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"One. Alpha Distributing is now a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Tri-Delta 
Corporation. Two. Mr. Anthony Escabar 
has been duly appointed by the President 
of Tri-Delta and confirmed by the Board 
of Directors as a Vice President of Tri-
Del ta and President of Alpha Distributing. 
Three. Tri-Delta Corporation will 
guarantee and support Alpha Distributing 
" (T. 38, lines 24-30) 
The defendant's primary interest in acquiring the 
soccer team was publicity (T. 19, 252). 
Following the agreement and negotiations with the 
American Soccer League for future payment of the Soccer 
Franchise, Escabar was to organize and operate the .soccer 
team. Of the promised $20,000, $10,000 was eventually paid 
by appellant by check, but the check bounced (T. 45, 46). 
A later check cleared another bank (T. 47). 
Following this initial check from the appellant, 
no more of the promised financial support was provided by the 
appellant for the operation of the soccer team and Mr. Escabar 
was forced to pay soccer expenses with capital of Alpha 
Distributing, expecting reimbursement so Alpha Distributing 
1vOl'.h1 r;ot qo bo.n~rti_?t tl:rough loss of operating capital 
(T. 43). Mr. Escabar contacted appellant numerous times and 
informed him of his cash needs for the operation of the soccer 
team (T. 47). The appellant promised Mr. Escabar that monies 
would be sent, but in the meantime, instructed Mr. Escabar to 
-5-
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continue paying expenses from the Alpha accounts (T.48). 
Mr. Escabar never received any further money from the 
appellant for the operation of the soccer team and 
was forced to pay all expenses from his own personal 
sources or the accounts of Alpha (T.69,74). In several 
cases, soccer players were given merchandise from Alpha 
in order to satisfy amounts owed them as salary for 
playing (T.168). At trial, the State produced numerous 
checks made by Alpha to cover the costs and expenses 
of the Utah Pioneers soccer team (T.50-69). 
The State produced evidence that many of appel-
lant's original material representations were false. 
Emerson Burgess stated at trial that he was the President 
of Zero Cold Corporation during 1976 (T.216). He testified 
that the defendant had offered to buy Zero Cold, but that 
the sale never went through (T.224,225). Fred Jenson 
testified that in 1976 he was an officer of a California 
bank that owned Harbor Rest Memorial Park (T.107). He 
stated that th2 defe~dant had negotiated to purchase the 
cemet:,ry, but never ca1~e up with any money (T.112). He 
testified defendant never owned Harbor Rest. 
Keith Downs testified that he was president of 
White Barns Condominiums and golf course in Ogden, Utah, 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in 1976 (T.191). Downs testified that the defendant 
never had any ownership interest in White Barns (T.192). 
Burt Elg testified that he was Vice President 
and Trust Officer of Continental Bank and Trust (1'.197). 
He stated that bank records showed no bank ownership 
interests in the name of the defendant, Tri-Delta or 
Frontier U.S.A. (T.198). 
John H. Kelly testified that he was secretary 
and treasurer of the Capital Heights project in 197?. 
(T.200). Mr. Kelly further testified that neither the 
defendant, Tri-Delta or Frontier U.S.A. every possessed 
any ownership interest in Capital Heights (T.202). 
Conrad Scheidel! testified that at the time 
appellant made representations, Frontier U.S.A. stock 
was not being sold over the counter, but that he had sold 
two (2) lots at $.62 per share, not $5.00 per share (T.204-207). 
In addition to this evidence, Bill Marcroft, 
a local television sportscaster, testified that he spoke 
with the appell3nt in 1976 at a new3 conference announcinq 
the soccer team's formation (T.210). Mr. Marcroft stated 
that when he asked the appellant how much money he was 
going to put into the franchise, the defendant told him he 
-7-
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would put $21 million into the team (T.211). The 
appellant told Mr. Marcroft that he was a millionaire 
and wanted the team for publicity (T.212). 
In January of 1977, Escabar made a final ~lea 
to defendant for money for his dying company (T.70-73). 
He received in return a letter stating that the original 
agreement had been rescinded back in August of 1977 (T. 
70-73). However, Escabar had never been notified of 
any rescission until January, and Escabar had had 
conversations with defendant after August in which the 
agreement appeared still to be in force (T.70-73). 
Also, Lyle Jenkins, a later manager of Alpha 
Distributing, testified that he was instructed by 
defendant in October to sell one of the remaining 
assets of Alpha Distributing and send the proceeds to 
the defendant in California. A check was produced to show 
that the proceeds were sent to defendant (R.168-169). 
After the presentation of all the evidence, 
the jury founJ the defenda~t guilty of theft by deception. 
This appeal follows. 
B. 
The procedural facts of which the Court 
should be aware are as follows: 
1. August 3, 1977, an information, signed by 
Robert R. Wallace, was filed in Third District Court 
(R. 7). 
-R-
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2. August 5, 1977, appellant was arraigned 
in District Court. At the arraignment appellant was 
represented by H. Ralph Klemm and Gerald L. Turner (R.8). 
3. August 15, 1977, appellant moved to quash 
the information on the grounds that the facts did not 
constitute an offense. The motion was denied and a bill 
of particulars was ordered (R.11). 
4. Trial was set for October 19, 1977 (R.8). 
5. October 19, 1977, the trial was continued 
to December 12, 1977 (R.15). 
6. November 15, 1977, Mr. Klemm and Mr. Turner 
withdrew as counsel (R.16). 
7. December 12, 1977, Randall Gaither appeared 
for appellant and moved for a continuance of the trial 
based upon the grounds that "defense counsel having 
just accepted the case and not being ready for trial at this 
time." Trial was set for March 6, 1978 (R.17). 
8. January 17, 1977 (sic, 1978) Randall Gaither 
sent a motion to withdraw as counsel to Robert R. Wallace, 
Assistant Attorney General, but did not file the motion 
with the cou=t nor obtain an order for withdrawal (R.46). 
A copy of this motion was introduced at a hearing on 
appellant's motion to quash before Honorable Judge Ernest 
Baldwin, March 1, 1978. A transcript of this hearing 
was not included in the documents forwarded to this Court, 
although all documents were designated (R.110). 
-9-
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9. February 24, 1978, RanclcHl Cailher f~'e·-'l a 
written notice of appearance of counsel with the court and 
a Motion to Quash (R.28,29). 
10. March 1, 1978, a hearing on the Motion to 
Quash was held before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin 
(R.27). 
11. The motion was denied on the grounds that 
the "said motion was not timely filed." (R.27,27). 
12. March 6-8, 1978, trial was held. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ATTORJ.~EY GENERAL OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH HAS THE AUTHORITY TO FILE 
AND SUBSCRIBE A CRIMINAL INFORMATION 
IN A STATE DISTRICT COURT. 
The Utah State Constitution, Article VII, 
Section 1, provides for the duties of the Attorney 
General as follows: 
"The executive Department shall 
consist of Cove~nor, 3ecret~~y of 
St2te, State Auditor, State ~reasurer, 
and Attorney General. • • They shall 
perform such duties as are prescribed 
by this Constitution and as may be 
prescribed by law." (EJT\phasis added. 
-10-
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Article VII, Section 18, further provides: 
"The Attorney General shall be 
the legal adviser of the State 
officers, and shall perform such 
other duties as may be provided by 
law." (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (1953), as amended, states: 
"It is the duty of the Attorney General: 
(1) To attend the Supreme Court of this 
state, and all courts of the United States, 
and prosecute or defend all causes to 
which the state ••• is a party. 
* * * (5) To exercise supervisory powers 
over the district and county attorneys of 
the state in all matters pertaining' to the 
duties of their offices. 
* * * (7) When required by the public service 
or directed by the governor to assist any 
district or county attorney in the discharge 
of his duties." 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (1953), as amended, was 
specifically interpreted in Meyers v. Second Judicial District 
Court, 108 Utah 32, 156 P.2d 711 (1945). In that case the 
appellant argued that the Attorney General did not have the 
power or right to appear before a grand jury as a prosecutor. 
The Court specifically quoted Sections (5) and (7) of the 
above mentioned statute and held that the Attorney Gener~l 
did have the authority to appear as a prosecutor before a grand 
jury. 1 The Court quoted Sacramento County v. Central Pacific 
1 In Meyers, the Court quotes Utah Code Ann. § 87-6-1 (1943), 
which has since become Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 (1953), as 
amended; the language of both statutes is identical. 
-11-
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Ry. Co., 61 Cal. 250 (1882), in ruling that: 
"The District Attorney had the 
power to commence and prosecute the 
action, subject to the supervision 
of the Attorney General (Pol. Code, 
470.) The last named officer has 
power, whenever, in his opinion, the 
public 5ervTce-~ire5lt:~-·-as3:cct_ • 
the District Attorney. (Ibid.) When 
he thus assists the District Attorney, 
he may, by virtue of his 'supervisory 
power over the District Attorneys 
in all matters pertaining to the 
duties of their offices,' assume a 
paramount control and direction 
of the business he and the District 
Attorney are jointly conducting." 
156 P. 2d at 715. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, the Attorney General has certain enumerated 
statutory powers, which have been interpreted to include the 
ability to appear before a grand jury as a prosecutor, 
Meyers, supra, but all these powers are in addition to those 
previously existing under the common law. 
The State of Utah has statutorily adopted the 
corrunon law of England by way of Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1 
(1953): 
"The COI!lillon law of England so far 
as it is not repugnant of, or in confli~t 
with, t~e Constitution or l~ws of the 
United States, or the Constitution or 
laws of this state, and so far only as 
it is consistent with and adapted to the 
natural and physical conditions of this 
state and the necessities of the people 
hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be 
the rule of decision in all courts of this 
state." 
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Although it is not generally the duty of the 
Attorney General to conduct criminal trials in lower 
courts, he may do so in states where the Attorney General 
excrci.;es cor:-lnron la•.·1 pcn·l2rs. 7 C.J.S., Attorney General, 
§ 9, p. 1234. Specifically, this power encompasses all 
aspects of the prosecution, from filing an information to 
the ultimate termination of proceedings. People v. Karrella, 
35 Mich.App. 541, 142 N.W.2d 676 (1971); State v. Daviess 
Circuit Court, 236 Ind. 624, 142 N.E.2d 626 (1957}. 
In Hansen v. Barlow, 23 Utah 2d 47, 456 P.2d 177 
(1969), the Utah Supreme Court considered the question of 
whether the Attorney General has common law powers in a case 
where the Attorney General sought to initiate a declaratory 
judgment action to determine the constitutionality of certain 
legislative amendments. The Court observed that the states 
are split on the issue; noted that the majority favor upholding 
such common law power and made a strong argument in favor of 
upholding the common law powers of the Attorney General in 
Utah. 456 P.2d at 178. 
A recent survey by the National Association of 
Attorneys General (hereinafter NAAG) reveals that the opinion 
of the Utah Court in Hansen is consistent with the position 
that is taken in the vast majority of state jurisdictions 
which have also held that the Office of the Attorney General 
-13-
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is vested with the common law powers. (Page 39, National 
Association of Attorneys General, Committee on the Office 
of Attorney General, February, 1971.) Attached is a 
tabular summa.ry prepared by the NP~"-.G, together with an 
index of the state decisions in support thereof (Appendix 
A and B). 
Courts in many jurisdictions have considered 
the relation of the powers of the Attorney General 
enumerated by statute to those existing under common law. 
Most courts follow the rationale expressed by the New 
York Court in People v. Miner, 2 Lans. 396 (1868): 
"As the powers of the Attorney 
General were not c·onferred by statute, 
a grant by statute of the same or other 
powers, would not operate to deprive 
him of those belonging to the office at 
common law, unless the statute, either 
expressly, or by reasonable intendment, 
forbade the exercise of powers not thus 
expressly conferred." 
Florida's court in State ex rel. Landis v. S. H. 
Kress & Co., 155 So. 823 (Fla. 1934), stated: 
the duties of such a11 
o£fic~ a~e so nurn2r0Js and varied that 
it has not been the policy of the 
Legislatures of the states to 
specifically enumerate them; that a 
grant to the off ice of some powers 
by statute does not deprive the Attorney 
General of those belonging to the office 
under the common law." Id. at 827. 
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In State ex rel. Barrett v. Boeckeler Lumber 
Co., 257 s.w. 453 (Mo. 1924), the Missouri Court concurred: 
"A grant by statute of the same or 
other powers does not operate to deprive 
hin1 [the Attorney GeneL"al] of those 
belonging to the officer under the 
common law, unless the statute, either 
expressly or by reasonable intendment, 
forbids the exercise of powers not thus 
expressly conferred. (6 C.J. 816). This 
view has been tacitly accepted, and 
acted upon, in this state for many years." 
Id. at 456. 
Therefore, in states like Utah which hqve adopted 
the common law, it is not necessary to enumerate the powers 
of the Attorney General, but the additional grant of 
specific, statutory responsibilities serves simply to 
supplement the common law powers, unless the statutes 
specifically divest the Attorney General thereof. 
An integral part of the combined common law 
and statutory powers of the Attorney General is the ability 
to file an information and prosecute a public offense in 
District Court. People v. Karrella, supra; State v. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE STATE PROVED ALL OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT BY 
DECEPTION, THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Appellant argues that his failure to object 
-15-
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to the alleged defect in the information at or before 
arraignment is rescued by the fact that jurisdictional 
defects in the information are grounds for a Motion in 
Arrest of Judgment and such issues can be raised at 
any time. Appellant contends that an information signed 
by a person not authorized is jurisdictionally defective. 
Thus, argues appellant, the supposed jurisdictional 
defect can be raised at any time and is not waived by 
failure to object before or at arraignment. 
Respondent asserts that appellant should have 
raised his objection at the proper time in order to 
allow respondent to correct the supposed defect and that 
his failure to object at or before arraignment or at 
least at the earliest practical time, waived any 
subsequent objection. 
As previously outlined, Utah Code Ann. § 67-5-1 
(1953), as amended, gives the Attorney General "supervisory 
powers" over "all matters pertaining to the duties" of the 
county attorney. Additionally, this statute provid~3 t~at 
the Attorney General may "assist any • • • county attorney 
in the discharge of his duties" when requested by the 
governor or when, in the judgment of the Attorney General, 
the "public service" so demands. In Sacramento County v. 
Central Pacific Ry. Co., supra, it was determined that the 
Attorney General could assume the "paramount control and 
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direction" of a case he and a county attorney were 
jointly prosecuting. 
Taken together, all of these statutory and 
caselaw pronouncements of the Attorney General's duties 
and authority lead to the reasonable conclusion that, 
at the very least, at certain times the Attorney General 
has power to file an information and fully prosecute 
any subsequent matters following therefrom. The officer 
who has the power to "supervise," or to assume a primary 
role in joint business would also have the basic authority 
and powers of the person supervised. For example, under 
the rubric of the National Labor Relations Act, although some 
persons are designated as supervisors and given supervisory 
duties, they still have the power and authority to perform 
any of the tasks of the persons supervised. N.L.R.B. v. 
Ertel Mfg. Corp., 352 F.2d 916 (C.A. Ind., 1965); N.L.R.B. 
v. Florida Agric. Supply Co., 328 F.2d 989 (C.A. Fla. 1964). 
This conclusion finds further support by 
considering the obvious legislative concern when giving 
th2 Attorney General po•·1er to supervise, assist and/or 
assume the primary role in a case jointly prosecuted with 
a county attorney. 
Pursuant to that legislative concern, 
the Attorney General was given all of the powers of a county 
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attorney to be exercised at various times, the most 
obvious of which would include death, disability, 
resignation or other absence of a county attorney, 
conflict of interest of the county attorney in a particular 
case, overwhelming caseload at a particular time, requested 
assistance, etc. 
Likewise, the Governor is empowered by statute 
to request the Attorney General to "assist any • 
county attorney in the discharge of his duty." If that 
assistance required the preparing and signing of an 
information by the Attorney General, it is logical to 
assume that the Governor's request for aid presupposes 
sufficient power in the Attorney General to prepare 
and file an information. 
Thus, from the statutory grants of power 
previously examined it is reasonable to conclude that 
at least at given times and in given circumstances the 
Attorney General can prepare and sign an information. 
A d.efendar.C: r:irosecutec1 unc1er such an information migL-
then legitimately raise the question, "Was this an 
appropriate case for the exercise of that power?" This 
question is not jurisdictional and is properly waived 
unless raised by a timely motion to quash the information. 
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Because this question is not jurisdictional, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-23-5 (2) (1953), specifically provides that 
one ground for a motion to quash an information is: "(c) 
That the prosecuting attorney h~d no authority to file the 
information." Thus, defendant could and should have filed 
a motion to quash the information clearly based on the 
above stated grounds, but Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-1 (1953), 
requires the defendant to raise his motion to quash the 
information before or at the time of arraignment on the 
information or at least in a timely manner. Otherwise, 
the objection is waived. 
"Upon being arraigned the defendant 
shall immediately, unless the court grants 
him further time, either move to quash the 
information or indictment, or plead thereto, 
or do both. If he moves to quash, without 
also pleading, and the motion is withdrawn, 
or overruled he shall immediately plead." 
In the instant case the information charging 
appellant was filed on August 4, 1977 (R.7), and the appellant 
pled thereto on August 5, 1977 (R.8), but he did not file his 
motion to quash the information until March 1, 1978 (R.29), 
just five days before trial was scheduled to begin (R.18). 
Defendant's motion was clearly untimely in light of the 
Section 77-23-1 requirement that such a motion be raised only 
before or at arraignment or at least in a timely manner (by 
leave of the court) as was found by the lower court (R.47). 
-19-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
When the defendant failed to raise his 
objection to the information at the time of his 
arraignment or as soon as practical thereafter with 
leave of the court, he waived his right to subsequently 
contest the validity of the information. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-21-5(2) (1953), prohibits any "objection 
to an information on the ground that it was not 
subscribed or verified (as provided in Section 
77-21-5(1)) ••• after moving to quash or pleading 
to the merits." (Emphasis added.) Therefore, when 
defendant pleaded to the information and made no 
motion to quash such before or at the time of 
his arraignment or as soon thereafter as practical, 
he waived any right to object to the content, 
authority or signing of the information. This 
conclusion was also reached by the lower court 
(R. 4 7) • 
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Utah Code Ann. § 77-16-2 (1953, as amended) provides: 
"No defect or irregularity in or 
want or absence of any proceeding or 
statutory requirement, prior to the 
filing of an information or indictment, 
including the preliminary hearing, 
shall constitute prejudicial error and 
the defendant shall be conclusively pre-
sumed to have waived any such defect, 
irregularity, want or absence of pro-
ceeding or statutory requirement, unless 
he shall before pleading to the in-
formation or indictment specifically 
and expressly object to the information 
or indictment on such ground. Whenever 
the consent of the state to any waiver 
by the defendant is required, such 
consent shall be conclusively presumed, 
unless the state before or at the time 
the defendant pleads to the information 
or indictment expressly objects to such 
waiver." 
This statute contemplates the circumstances of this 
case. Even though Mr. Gaither did not represent appellant 
at his arraignment, he actively represented appellant as early 
as December 12, 1977. He had ample time to challenge any 
alleged defects in the information long before the March 6, 
1978 trial date. Even though appellant failed to challenge 
the validity of the information, he does not argue that any 
prejudice o= injustice resulted ~ecause of the all~ged i~-
firmities in the information. The State provided a bill of 
particulars (R. 12-14, 32-34), it provided and discussed with 
appellant's attorney all of the state witnesses, (R. 30-31) and 
it did not oppose appellant's motions to continue the trial 
date. No confusion or conflict existed about who was 
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prosecuting the charged offense. Appellant's waiver did not 
result in hardship or unfairness, nor did it comproraise or 
jeopardize any possible defenses. Utah Code Ann. § 77-23-10' 
I 
(1953, as amended) also provides that all objections which I 
would be grounds for a motion to quash, except those which 
are grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment, are waived 
unless timely raised. Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-34-1 and 77-3S-ll 1 
define grounds for a motion in arrest of judgment. These 
statutes include jurisdictional defects, but do not include 
challenges to the appropriateness of a supervisory prosecutin 
authority exercising that authority, as in the case here. 
Under statutory provisions, appellant is presumed 
to have conclusively waived any possible defects in the in-
formation and his challenge is without merit. 
This same result has also been reached in several 
other jurisdictions with similar statutory requirements as 
to informations. Gerlaugh v. Florida Parole Corrunission, 139 
So. 2d 888 (Fla., 1962); State v. Amart, 328 S.W. 2d 569 
(Mo., 1959); Arnold v. State, 233 Ark. 3, 342 S.W. 2d 291 
(1960). Flo~ida 
supra, the defendant contended that a constitutional pro-
vision required the state's attorney to sign an information 
and not an assistant state's attorney as had done so in the 
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information charging defendant. Defendant Gerlaugh did not 
raise this objection until after he had pleaded to the in-
formation. The Supreme Court of Florida, while noting 
several cases where it had reversed a decision based on this 
same contention, where such contention had been raised in a 
timely fashion, refused to entertain defendant's objection 
because he had not raised it before pleading to the infer-
mation. The Florida Court stated that granting the desired 
relief to the defendant: 
" ••• who has waived his right to object, 
as pointed out in the previous cases, is 
clearly unjustified. The quoted language 
must be considered as holding only that 
upon timely objections to an information 
on the ground that it was not signed by the 
State's Attorney such an information is 
null, void and of no effect." 139 So. 2d at 890 
The purpose behind this longstanding rule is clear. 
When the defendant objects to the information before he pleads 
thereto or as soon thereafter as practical, it gives the 
court an opportunity to examine his objection to the information 
before incurring the costs, in time and money, of going to 
If t~e cou=t ~inds the objection to be without merit, 
th~ defendant must then proceed to trial and focus his efforts 
on those proceedings. At that point, further contentions as 
to the information cannot be raised in order to allow the 
court to handle trial proceedings without distraction. 
-23-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
\~here the court finds defendant's objections to 
the information to be meritorious, it must allow the state 
to correct the errors if possible, or, where the errors 
cannot be corrected, quash the information. U.C.A. § 77-17-Ji 
of court, in any matter of form or substance at any time 
before the defendant pleads thereto." Specifically where 
an information has not been properly verified according to 
section 77-21-5, section 77-23-3 (2) (b) allows the prosecutinj 
attorney to correct the verification at the hearing on the 
motion. If the prosecuting attorney does such, the motion 
to quash will be overruled. This requirement has special 
application in the instant matter because an assistant Cou~ 
Attorney was present at each stage of the proceedings (as 
illustrated by selected minute entries - R. 15, 17), and 
could have properly verified the information had he been 
requested. But because defendant failed to timely motion th< 
court to quash the information and challenge the signing of 
the information by an assistant attorney general, the State 
fective information as allowed in sections 77-17-3 anj 
77-23-5 (2) (b). Thus, defendant's failure to challenge the 
information in a timely fashion not only waived his right to 
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challenge it at a subsequent date, but also prejudiced the 
respondent's ability to a~cnd the information by correcting 
the supposed deficiency. 
Thus, respondent asserts that the lower court 
properly determined that defendant's motion was not filed in 
a timely manner. Moreover, because defendant failed to timely 
object, he waived his right to challenge the alleged error 
in the information and robbed respondent of his opportunity 
to amend the information by correcting the alleged defect. 
Respondent further notes that if this Court accepts 
defendant's contentions that the Attorney General cannot 
sign an information, that his signing of the instant infor-
mation was a jurisdictional defect and therefore reversed 
defendant's conviction, jeopardy would not attach and de-
fendant could be prosecuted a second time under a valid 
information. State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538, 155 P. 2d 741 
(1945). Such a decision would mean not only that all the 
time defendant has served on his first conviction would be 
considered dead time, but that the State would be put to the 
Resp011.~l'.=:n.t 
asserts that it is contrary to public policy to force the 
state to assume the burden of a new trial in the instant 
matter on the basis of an alleged defect in the information. 
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POINT III 
BECAUSE THE STATE PROVED ALL OF THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT BY 
DECEPTION, THE LOWER COURT PROPERLY 
DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS. 
Defendant argu2s that Alpha Distributing did not 
suffer actual loss and got merely what it bargained for in 
association with the defendant. Believing that there was 
actual loss by Alpha Distributing, defendant reasons that 
an element of the crime of theft by deception as described 
in U.C.A. § 76-6-405 (1973) was not established and that his 
motion to dismiss should have been granted. 
Respondent asserts that every element of the crime 
of theft by deception was established at defendant's jury tr~ 
and, therefore, the trial court properly denied defendant's 
motion to dismiss. 
Defendant was charged with and convicted of theft 
by deception as described in U.C.A. § 76-6-405 (1973): 
"A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises control over 
property of another by deception and 
with a purpose to deprive him thereof." 
a prosecution for theft by deception are found in Utah Code 
Annotated, §76-6-401: 
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" (l) 'Property' means anything of 
value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, captured 
or domestic animals and birds, written 
instruments or other writings representing 
or embodying rights concerning real or 
personal property, labor, services, or 
otherwise containing anything of value to 
t':1e 01.1:-i.e:c, co:-n.rnodit:.ie.::; of a. -~·-1blic L:t.ility 
nature such as telecommunications, gas, 
electricity, steam, or water, and trade 
secrets, meaning the whole or any portion 
of any scientific or technical information, 
design, process, procedure, formula, or 
invention which the owner thereof intends 
to be available only to persons selected by 
him. 
(2) 'Obtain' means, in relation to 
property, to bring about a transfer of , 
possession or of some other legally re-
cognized interest in property, whether 
to the obtainer or another; in relation to 
labor or services, to secure performance 
thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, 
to make any facsimile, replica, photograph, 
or other reproduction. 
(31 'Purpose to deprive' means to 
have the conscious object: 
(a) To withhold property 
permanently or for so extended 
a period or to use under such 
circumstances that a substantial 
portion of its economic value, or 
of the use and benefit thereof, 
would be lost; or 
(b) To restore the property 
oPl'.r 11po::_ ~a._;~,,.ent o~ a rei:Tard or 
o-:h..:: corr::;2ns(J_ tio_:; or 
(c) To dis2ose of the ,-,,roperty 
under circumstances that make it 
unlikely that the owner will recover 
it. 
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(4) 'Obtri.in or exercise unauthorized 
control' means, but is not necessarilv 
limited to, conduct heretofore deEine~ 
or known as cornr1on-law larceny b~' trespassory 
taking, larceny by conversion, larceny bv 
bailee, and embezzlement. 
( 5) 'Deception' occurs when a person 
irlt,~ntion?-i lly: 
(a) Creates or confirms 
by words or conduct an impression 
of law or fact that is false and 
that the actor does not believe 
to be true and that is likely to 
affect the judgment of another 
in the transaction; or 
(b) Fails to correct a 
false impression of law or fact 
that is likely to affect th-e~­
judgment of another and that the 
actor does not now believe to be 
true; or 
(c) Prevents another from 
acquiring information likely to 
affect his judgment in the trans-
action; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise 
transfers or encumbers property 
without disclosing a lien, security 
interest, adverse claim, or other 
legal impediment to the enjoyment 
of the property, whether the lien, 
security interest, claim, or im-
pediment is or is not valid or is 
not a matter of official record; or 
(e) Promises performance that 
is likely to affect the judgment of 
another in the transaction, which 
performa~ :8 ~!1e actor Joes not in-
t~~~ to · ~rforn or ~ncw3 ~ill not be 
p3rEor~e2; pro\rided, ~owev?~, th~t 
failure to perform the promise in 
issue without other evidence of 
intent or knowledge is not sufficient 
proof that the actor did not intend 
to perform or knew the promise would 
not be performed." (Emphasis added.) 
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In addition to the above elements, the Utah Court 
has required that the victim sustain a "pecuniary or property 
loss by reason of the transaction relied upon." State v. Morris, 
RS Tltah 210, 38 P. 2d 1097, 1100 (1934). But to this 
reauirement the following caveat exists: 
. the actual fraud and 
prejudice . . is determined according 
to the situation of the victim immediately 
after he parts with his property. If he 
gets what was pretended and what he bargained 
for, there is no fraud or prejudice." 38 P. 
2d at 1099. 
See also State v. Fisher, 70 Utah 115, 8 P. 2d 589 at 590 (1932). 
In the instant case, the State established each and 
every element of the crime of theft by deception. The de-
fendant claimed to be the owner of numerous business enter-
prises including Continental Bank and Trust Co., Zero Cold 
Corporation, Harbor Rest Memorial Park, 1n1ite Berns Golf 
Course, and the Capitol Heights project. (T. 18-20). Additionally, 
defendant told Mr. Escabar, as Alpha's representative, that 
certain stock he would be given was trading at $5.00 per share. 
(T. 18). Defendant further represented that he would put 
32J ~~~~io~ ~~ll0~s i~to t~2 Uta~ Pi0n~ers Soccer Team (T. 211) 
and that he would provide total financial tacking and operating 
capital for the team. (T. 38). 
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At trial eacl1 of these representations 1·?i1S proven 
to be false and that defendant made these re?resentations 
knowing them to be such. (T. 112, 192, 198, 202, 216). 
Each of these representations was made with the 
This element was established by the fact that 
required Alpha Distributing to "become a part 
the defendant I' 
of Frontier U.S. 
stating that Frontier "needed assets", (T. 32), that the 
defendant provided no money for team expenses after the 
initial funding (T. 69, 74), and that defendant instructed 
Mr. Escabar to pay team expenses out of Alpha Distributing 
accounts with the promise that he would reimburse Alpha, but 
such reimbursement was not forthcominq. (T. 47, 48, 69, 74), 
I At trial, the State clearly established that defendant wanted 
the soccer team solely for publicity purposes (T. 19, 252), 
hoping that such exposure would benefit his loan fee operatior 
Actual fraud resulted when Alpha Distributing paid 
substantially all of the expenses of the Utah Pioneers, ex-
penses which the defendant had promised to pay,.and the de-
-television expo3u:::e t.1:ccuyh his ·"3.lleged 11 0\,;ne:cship 1 ' of the 
team. It is clear that obtaining a benefit, such as ad- I 
vertising, through fraud and deceit will sufficiently establ0 1 
-30-
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one cf the elements of theft by deception. Stokes v. State,, 
Okl. Cr., 336 P. 2d 425 (1961). See also Beasley v. People, 
168 Colo. 286, 450 P. 2d 658 (1969). 
Finally, Mr. Escabar repeatedly testified that he 
entered into the soccer agreement with the defendant on 
behalf of Alpha because of the defendant's representations of 
financial success and security (T. 23, 39). 
All of these facts, taken together, amount to the 
theft of Alpha's property by deception as defined by U.C.A. 
§ 76-6-401(5) (e) (1973) quoted above. 
Thus, the State having established all the elements 
of theft by deception, there was no basis for the trial court 
to grant defendant's motion to dismiss and such was properly 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Attorney General had authority to file the 
information in this case. The lower court correctly ruled 
that appellant had waived any objection to possible defects 
in the info~mation because any such defects wer~ not juris-
the state sufficiently proved all the elements of the crime 
charged. 
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Appellant was prosecuted by a proper authority 
and his conviction should be affirmed. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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